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Origen of Alexandria:  
The Bible and Philosophical Rationality, or:  
Problems of Traditional Dualisms
The thesis to be presented in this paper is relatively simple: I wish to demon-
strate that a central element of rationalization, and not only in Antiquity, lies in 
resolving dualisms, or more precisely, dual models of reality. If we subscribe to 
Carl Friedrich Gethmann’s process-oriented definition of “rationality” as “devel-
oping processes for the discursive upholding of claims to validity,”1 then “ration-
alization” would be defined as the optimization of the discursive upholding of 
validity claims. The Christian religion asserted such validity claims in Antiquity: 
It intended that the consensus within a specific religious group as to the truth 
of certain doctrines and behavioral prescriptions should be shared by the entire 
society.
One notable rationalistic impulse was provided by the so-called Christian 
Alexandrians, and not by coincidence, as the already Hellenized Judaism of 
Alexandria had laid the foundations for it, and the city’s character as a center 
of learning was fertile ground for such a rationalizing impulse.2 The Christian 
Alexandrians, principally Clement of Alexandria (c. 140/150–220 CE) and Origen 
(c. 185–254 CE), argued for the validity of Christian precepts regarding the world 
and of behavioral prescriptions according to contemporary criteria of rational-
ity; in contrast to the preceding generations of Christian theologians, they were 
familiar with those criteria from the source texts of Platonic and Stoic philosophy 
and not just from compendia or general educational tracts.3 These Alexandrians 
optimized the hitherto prevalent ways of reflecting upon Christianity as it had 
existed from the earliest days of Christendom, from Paul in the first century and 
through apologists such as Justin and bishops like Irenaeus of Lyons in the second 
century. We can join Gethmann in regarding such a purposeful optimization of 
rationality as “rationalization.”4
1 Gethmann 1995: col. 468. See also Koch 2016 and Sperber 1985:89. I published parts of this 
argument more extensively in my German article “Origenes und Paulus” (Markschies 2015).
2 For the relationship between religion and rationalization in general cf. especially Max Weber 
and his concept of the “disenchantment of the world”: Drehsen 2009; Schluchter 1976.
3 See Markschies 2012.
4 Gethmann 1995: col. 463.
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What I am concerned with herein is a single such optimization process, 
namely, the resolving of insufficiently complex dualisms. Here rationalization 
does not mean the simplification of, say, a mythological conception of the world 
through reduction to certain suitable principles, but rather the addition of com-
plexity to an insufficiently complex theory. The principal aim of this paper, then, 
is to demonstrate that modern scholarship has failed to perceive this increased 
complexity through the dissolution of dualisms in its reconstruction of the teach-
ings of the Alexandrians as an ensemble of dualisms, and in particular in its treat-
ment of the dualism of the Bible versus Philosophy, thus leveling the differentia 
specifica between the pre-Alexandrian and Alexandrian eras of Christian theol-
ogy.
For obvious reasons, I will focus on a single Christian Alexandrian, Origen, 
who is justifiably to be regarded as the first Christian polymath of antiquity.5 
He lived in Alexandria until the thirties of the third century, first as a teacher of 
grammar and student of the Platonic philosopher Ammonius Saccas, and later as 
a teacher at a sort of Christian private university. From the 230s until his death in 
the mid-250s, at the behest of the bishops of Caesarea and Jerusalem, he worked 
as a preacher in a small church near the port of Caesarea and as a gifted teacher 
at a Christian educational institution, which taught the entire educational canon 
of antiquity and, as its pinnacle, Christian theology.
Origen overcame the dualism of “Bible versus Philosophy,” which shaped 
the Christian theology of the second century and in particular the so-called 
Gnostic systems and their contestation within the majority church, but his tran-
scendence of it has been given too little attention in the sweep of scholarship, 
especially in the twentieth century. One can – with a nod to a currently popular 
paradigm – describe his thinking, more appropriately than in such dualisms, as a 
non- hierarchical network of knowledge systems continuously reconfigured accord-
ing to current requirements. By “knowledge” – to formulate a bare-bones working 
definition – I mean some part of the entirety of all reality-interpreting descriptions 
of elements of that reality, where “reality” is understood not as something which 
is perceived simply as a possibility but as something asserted to be “real.”6 In 
using the term “system of knowledge” I am describing a systematic ordering of 
knowledge associated with a particular validity claim.
If “knowledge” only ever exists in multidimensional relations in which, for 
instance, mental and epistemic structures overlap (“Origen knows something” 
and “Origen knows something”), it becomes clear that systematization or ordering 
5 Cf., e.  g., Nautin 1977 and Vogt 2002.
6 Detel 2009:184–186; Sarasin 2011:159; for more in general: Mittelstrass 1996; Anacker 2004.
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consists in a particular arrangement of knowledge according to certain of its indi-
vidual relations. Such a systematization or ordering of knowledge into a knowl-
edge system can occur in two fundamental ways: either in the form of a stable 
hierarchy, as in a hierarchy tree; or in the form of a network of essentially decen-
tralized, plural nodes or foci. In an important article entitled “Was ist Wissens-
geschichte,”7 Philipp Sarasin, a historian who now teaches in Zurich, described 
how, in a modern conception of the history of knowledge, “knowledge systems” 
are viewed not as hierarchical structures of more and less useful, more and less 
important, or permitted and forbidden, as in previous centuries, but rather as 
networks of knowledge stores in which the focus is placed here or there based 
on circumstances. Thus, knowledge systems are comparable to neural networks 
in the brain, in which, rather than some central control center determining the 
hierarchy of all processes, neural circuitry emerges in decentralized processes – 
in processes that develop and pathways that perpetuate themselves.8
Heretofore, Origen’s thinking has often been described as a singular, strictly 
hierarchical and therein completely stable system of knowledge; scholars were 
long concerned only with the question of whether the top level of this knowledge 
system was a theology based on biblical texts or a philosophy drawn from Pla-
tonic writings. What is surprising about this question is its construal of biblical 
theology and Platonic philosophy as two stable entities completely autonomous 
from one another, as distinct to the observer as two blocks of marble in a land-
scape. One need not, as Ulrich Berner did in his 1981 volume on Origen in the 
“Erträge der Forschung”9 series, comb through the entirety of the secondary liter-
ature on the Alexandrian theologian, collected in three massive volumes,10 to rec-
ognize the bitter dispute being waged among scholars as to how the two knowl-
edge systems – biblical theology on the one hand and Platonic philosophy on 
the other – are hierarchized in the case of Origen. On the one hand there are very 
simple models: My Roman Catholic Patristic teacher in Tübingen, Hermann Josef 
Vogt, propounded the basic dogma of Catholic French Origen scholarship, which 
acknowledged the Christian Alexandrian as having been well versed in philoso-
phy but supposed him to have remained loyal to biblical norms in all cases of con-
flict between biblical texts and Platonic philosophy.11 For Vogt, as, for example, 
for Henri Crouzel, Origen is at core a biblical theologian, with a knowledge system 
7 Sarasin 2011.
8 On the structure of neural networks see Singer 2001 and 2002.
9 Berner 1981.
10 Crouzel 1971, 1982, 1996.
11 Vogt 1999, esp. 191–195; 2002.
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in which the biblical-theological and Platonic-philosophical systems are clearly 
hierarchized.12 The counter-model to this interpretation, not coincidentally, 
was asserted by Protestant theologians such as the reformed French theologian 
Eugène de Faye (1860–1929), in a major, three-volume work published between 
1923 and 1928.13 According to de Faye, Origen was the first Christian thinker to 
introduce basic concepts of Middle Platonic philosophy into the interpretation 
of the Christian Bible and thus into theology; he was much more committed to 
philosophical concepts like the two-world doctrine, the priority of spiritual being 
over material reality and so on than to biblical concepts.14
Of course there were always moderating concepts floating around, and even 
Crouzel and de Faye were not so radically one-sided as I have portrayed them here 
for reasons of economy and illustration. The most appealing example of such a 
middle way comes to us via Adolf von Harnack’s very late article on Origen in 
the fourth volume of the second edition of the Protestant encyclopaedia Die Reli-
gion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, which appeared in 1930, the year of Harnack’s 
death.15 On the one hand, Harnack emphasizes that Origen, with his philosophi-
cal theology, had presented “merely a variation of the post-Platonic Stoic system” 
and speculated in a rather elevated fashion on biblical texts from within the orbit 
of these philosophical orientations. On the other hand, Harnack wisely observes 
that this speculation is “bound in its understanding of the Bible to the rule of 
faith … which the church, following in the apostolic tradition, developed from 
the Bible according to O(rigen) in contrast to the false understanding of the here-
tics.”16 The rule of faith, regula fidei or κανὼν τῆς πίστεως,17 is the formulation – 
still free in terms of language – of basic truths of the Christian faith such as the 
affirmation of the one God, the one Christ and the one church. And then Harnack 
gives us this image: “The church gnostic is like an airship pilot; though he may lift 
off and rise up to the sun, his balloon is a captive one that can never lose contact 
with the firm ground of the rule of faith.”18
12 Crouzel 1962:215–216; 1989:156–163.
13 De Faye 1923–1928.
14 De Faye 1928:286: “Y avait-il donc chez Origène deux homes, un philosophe et un croyant? 
Une cloison étanche les séparait-elle? … Nous estimons qu’Origène m’avait aucune peine à passer 
de l’un à l’autre, parce que le philosophe et le croyant, le didascale et le prêtre, n’étaient que les 
deux côtés d’une seule et même personnalité. … Sa philosophie était saturée d’esprit chrétien, 
comme sa foi était imbue de sa pensée religieuse.”
15 Harnack 1930.
16 Ibid.:783.
17 Ohme 1998:1–17, esp. 2–3.
18 Harnack 1930:783.
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No matter how the relationship between biblical theology and Platonic phi-
losophy in Origen was defined, it was popular to describe his system of knowledge 
as a hierarchy of knowledge stores that could be separated into two static blocks. 
Harnack’s differentiation between a down-to-earth interpretation of the Bible ori-
ented towards the rule of faith, the regula fidei, and an aloof, airy or elevated realm 
of philosophical speculation is perhaps the clearest metaphor for how knowledge 
stores are modeled as separate entities and how systems of knowledge are seen to 
a great extent as hierarchically organized systems.
If we stay with the more recent history of knowledge, a notable representative 
of which is the aforementioned science historian Philipp Sarasin, and describe 
systems of knowledge much more strongly as a network of fluid hierarchizations 
reconfigured according to current requirements, this of course also changes how 
we describe the relationship between biblical theology and Platonic philosophy 
in Origen compared to the classic concepts of the twentieth century, represented 
on the one hand by Crouzel and Vogt, and on the other by de Faye and, to an 
extent, by Harnack.
To the question of whether Origen was loyal to the Bible or to the philoso-
phy of Plato, one might now, somewhat flippantly, respond: “It depends.”19 It 
depends, for example, on whether this exegete and thinker of Antiquity was even 
aware of a conflict that we nowadays believe to exist. It depends on the context 
he was writing in at any given time, or rather, as Sarasin puts it, on “forms of rep-
resentation and the mediality of knowledge.” More simply, he tended to platonize 
less in sermons than he did in the famous “fundamental writings,” Περὶ ἀρχῶν/
De principiis.20 To be sure, Origen’s sermons were directed to his very ordinary 
congregants in a Mediterranean harbor town and provincial capital, while the 
fundamental writings are presumably the closing lecture at his private university, 
aimed at presenting students with a comprehensive view of all known knowledge 
stores against the background of the concept of God, Creation and the Revelation, 
together with an appropriate understanding of these. In other words, the aim of 
the sermons was to invite non-academics – if I may again put it in anachronis-
tic terms – to readings of the Bible and afterwards, in the sermon, to examine 
more closely what they had heard.21 In the lecture hall, by contrast, Origen’s stu-
dents were given to understand that the pagan canon of teachings not only fit in 
well with Christian theology (or “Christian philosophy,” as Origen called it22) but 
19 For this question cf. now Edwards 2002.
20 Lies 1992:6–23.
21 Markschies 1997; Monaci Castagno 1987:50–64.
22 Markschies 2007a:70–75.
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should, as it were, be framed by it and integrated into a truly comprehensive, 
convincing and appropriate system. In other words, these teachings can be pre-
sented and learned within a hierarchical system of knowledge, which, in theory, 
is naturally so in accordance with God’s will. But this we can label “theology 
as prescribed”; “theology as practiced” might well be quite different. However, 
though I cannot show this in detail in the present framework, the fluid structure 
of the network differentiates Origen’s thinking in the third century from Christian 
concepts of the second century – for example, among the apologists of Irenaeus.
I would like, in conclusion, to illustrate my thesis once again by taking a brief 
look at an example – that of anthropology. For many obvious reasons, I will con-
centrate on one commentary; I will therefore not be looking at the homilies on 
the First Epistle to the Corinthians, which I have been trying to edit for years from 
fragments of catenae, but will look instead at the Commentary on the Epistle to 
the Romans, edited by Caroline Hammond Bammel,23 which, however, is availa-
ble to us only in the abridged and dogmatically corrected and/or updated Latin 
translation by Rufinus of Aquileia and some Greek fragments, mainly from the 
Byzantine Chain Commentaries, the above-mentioned catenae.24 In this transla-
tion, completed in 406 CE, fifteen books were abridged to ten (there really is some-
thing in the old preconception that Greek was more abundant and Latin briefer, to 
recall once again, albeit partly with tongue in cheek, the highly problematic folk 
psychologies that were so popular in Antiquity25).
Origen wrote this commentary around 150 years before Rufinus translated 
it, in 243–244, after he had already lived, preached and taught in Caesarea for 
ten years.26 It was the mature late work of a man who had once been a sixteen-
year-old grammar teacher, but who had long since become a teacher of theol-
ogy renowned throughout the Empire and a highly respected scholar, as shown 
by the enthusiastic graduation speech of Gregor Thaumaturgus.27 Having dealt 
elsewhere with Origen’s Commentary on Romans in terms of its antique liter-
ary context and its interpretative methodology,28 I shall now concentrate on his 
anthropology as demonstrated in this work.
23 Hammond Bammel 1990, 1997, 1998; on the biblical text see Hammond Bammel 1985.
24 Mühlenberg 2012; 1989.
25 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes II 6: “eadem enim dicuntur a multis, ex quo libris omnia 
referserunt”; Gigon 1973.
26 Cf. the introduction by Theresia Heither to her edition and translation: Heither 1990:7–41, 
esp. 7–15.
27 Crouzel and Brakmann 1983; Markschies 2007a:73–74, 102–104.
28 Markschies 1999.
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In Origen’s eyes, anthropology undoubtedly belongs to the particularly 
weighty theological problems highlighted, discussed and examined by Paul in 
the Epistle to the Romans, the treatment and resolution of which only the sim-
ilarly consummate interpreter could adequately reflect and comment upon. The 
Commentary’s presentation of the basal constitution of man as comprising mind 
and body, with the soul as an intermediary between the two,29 poses less of a 
problem than the freedom with which the thus-constituted man can behave – or 
not, as the case may be – in the face of divine law. It is this problem that I would 
like to look at in the following paragraphs, because it is here that the Pauline and 
Platonic (and also the Stoic) elements in Origen’s thinking – or simply his system 
of knowledge – can be followed so well.
It can be shown that Origen reads his Pauline text with a solid belief that man 
is free in his decision-making and in his decisions for or against God.30 Thus, for 
our modern tastes, Origen comes into considerable conflict with the deterministic 
motifs in the Epistle to the Romans, particularly in the seventh and ninth chap-
ters. However, the matter is not as simple as might be presumed on the basis of the 
above-described conception of a hierarchizing conflict between the two “blocks” 
of a biblical – or, more precisely, Pauline – anthropology, on the one hand, and a 
philosophical – or, more precisely, Platonic – anthropology with Stoic elements, 
on the other. In the first and second book of his Commentary on Romans, Origen 
speaks in very Pauline terms of the power of sin31 – for example, in the nice image 
of man as a house with two doors to the soul, allowing desire to enter on one side 
and virtue on the other. If virtue is spurned, it departs from that place, leaving the 
man who has thus fallen to succumb to his desires, in the way described by Paul 
at the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans.32
29 Origenes/Rufinus, Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos I 21, ad Romanos 1:24–25 (Hammond 
Bammel 1990:88, ll. 40–47 = Heither 1990:148, 10–24): “Frequenter in scripturis inuenimus et a 
nobis saepe dissertum est quod homo spiritus et corpus et anima esse dicatur. Uerum cum dicitur 
quia caro concupiscit aduersus spiritum spiritus autem aduersus carnem, media procul dubio 
ponitur anima quae uel desideriis spiritus adquiescat uel ad carnis concupiscentias inclinetur; 
et si quidem se iunxerit carni unum cum ea corpus in libidine et concupiscentiis eius efficitur, si 
uero se sociauerit spiritui, unus cum ea spiritus erit.” Cf. also Theiler 1970.
30 For an overview see Perrone 2000; for context see Dihle 1985:124–126 and in general Benja-
mins 1994.
31 Heither 1990:111–126.
32 Origenes/Rufinus, Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos I 21, ad Romanos 1:24–25 (Hammond 
Bammel 1990:90, ll. 85–94 = Heither 1990:152, 10–20): “Ponamus esse aliquod domicilium, in 
quo cum corpore et spiritu uelut cum duobus consiliariis habitet anima; pro foribus uero huius 
domicilii astare pietatem omnesque cum ea uirtutes; ex alia uero parte impietatem omnesque 
luxuriarum ac libidinum formas et expectare animae nutum, quem ex duobus pro foris obser-
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At the beginning of the Commentary, then, there is not much evidence of 
the light image of a human being who is free to decide, which Origen depicts 
mainly in his Commentary on the seventh chapter, where he simply assumes it 
axiomatically with certain philosophical prerequisites. One can say, perhaps, that 
within the network of knowledge that marks Origen, the Pauline texts he admires 
sometimes have a strong influence, and their anthropological concepts come into 
the foreground, overlaying others that originate more from Platonic or Stoic phi-
losophy.
However, in other places – or, to use Sarasin’s term, within other contexts – the 
network of knowledge may be organized very differently. I have already pointed 
out how Origen, in the sixth book of the Commentary, assumes axiomatically that 
man has the freedom to choose for or against divine law. The human being is 
made in God’s image and would for that reason alone be free. He is responsible to 
God and free for that reason as well. Only Gnostic heresies can put determination 
or even predestination in the place of freedom of decision.33 However, how does 
Origen explain passages such as Romans 7:19 – “For I do not do the good I want 
to do, but the evil I do not want to do”34 – in which Paul speaks of the good not 
being able to manifest itself, although the will is there? Commenting on this verse, 
Origen invokes the prosopopoeia (προσωποποϊία), a typical method of literary 
hermeneutics drawn from the pagan art of interpretation:35 “Paul, as a teacher of 
the church, himself takes on the role of the weak.”36 That is, Paul makes use of the 
literary device of speaking in the form of several different persons. Origen, we may 
uantibus chorum introduci ad se desideret, quem repelli. Nonne, si spiritui obtemperans et meli-
ori usa consiliario pietatis et pudicitiae ad se euocauerit chorum, ille alius spretus repudiatusque 
discedet?”
33 Origenes/Rufinus, Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos VI 1, ad Romanos 6:12–14 (Ham-
mond Bammel 1997:456, l. 28 – 457, l. 38 = Heither 1990:192, 10–21): “Illud tamen aduerte, quod 
ostendens in nostra potestate situm, ut non regnet in corpore nostro peccatum, praeceptum dat 
apostolus dicens: ‘Non ergo regnet peccatum in uestro mortali corpore ad oboediendum de deriis 
eius.’ Nisi enim esset in nostra potestate, ut non regnaret in nobis peccatum, praeceptum utique 
non dedisset. Quomodo ergo possibile est, ut peccatum in carne nostra non regnet? Si faciamus 
illud, quod idem apostolus dicit: ‘Mortificate membra uestra, quae sunt super terram,’ et si sem-
per mortem Christi in corpore nostro circumferamus. Certum namque est, quia ubi mors Christi 
circumfertur, non potest regnare peccatum.”
34 Οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω. For one of a great many 
secondary works see Vollenweider 1989:339–374.
35 Villani 2008. 
36 Origenes/Rufinus, Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos VI 9, ad Romanos 7:14–25a (Ham-
mond Bammel 1997:509, ll. 45–47 = Heither 1990:270, 22–23): “… hic iam tamquam doctor eccle-
siae personam in semet ipsum suscipit infirmorum.”
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infer, did not perceive his interpretation of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the 
Romans as a philosophical remodeling of Pauline theology, espousing, against 
the literal sense of the Epistle, a certain position concerning man’s freedom of 
decision; he saw it, rather, as the product of a literary analysis, the identification 
of the prosopopoeia. He thus, as we would put it today, linked different knowledge 
stores – literary, philosophical and theological – in a context-related, decentral-
ized, non-hierarchical network, enabling him to offer a different interpretation 
here than in the commentary on the first chapter of the Epistle.
While the present framework does not allow me to examine the picture I have 
drawn here in more detail, I believe I have shown that one cannot use the dual 
model of a conflict between biblical texts and philosophical theories to describe 
the fluidity of the systems of knowledge that Origen deploys, which are reconfig-
ured according to his current requirements. The dual, hierarchical, conflictual 
approach thus misses the point of his thinking. And it should be clear, without 
saying too much, that this flexibilization of knowledge stores in Origen may be 
described as a rationalization or optimization of the Christian strategy of argu-
mentation for its claims to the validity of its own theory.
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